Ownership and governance of Portuguese credit co-operatives: the legal framework by Cabo, Paula & Rebelo, João
1ICA European Research Conference
Lyon, 2-4 September 2010
“Co-operatives contributions to a plural economy”
Ownership and Governance of Portuguese Credit Co-operatives:
The Legal Framework
Paula Cabo1 and João Rebelo2
Abstract
Today, financial system enterprises operate in an environment full of global opportunities and
threats; and in the sequence of corporate scandals and world financial crisis, the banking
activity is constrained by ethical self-restraining as well as innovative regulations enforced by
domestic and global governance institutions. The dual nature of credit cooperative is reflected
by their formal and institutional solutions. They need to meet both banking and cooperative
regulations, especially for those dedicated to relations between the two areas; hence, they
result from considering their singularity and consistency. The main aim of this paper is to
provide an insight of the Portuguese legal framework of cooperative credit.
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11. Introduction
During the last three decades, unprecedented changes in communications and information
technologies have created conditions to an even-more-global economy. Relatively to financial
system, undoubtedly, in the second decade of the 21st century, the firm environment is full of
global opportunities and threats; and in the sequence of corporate scandals and world
financial crisis, the banking activity is constrained by ethical self-restraining as well as
innovative regulations enforced by domestic and global governance institutions.
Over the past decade, dull but safe, cooperative banks have steadily increased their share of
retail banking in Europe´s credit banking market…. A 2009 study by the Bundesbank,
Germany´s central bank , into the connection between financial stability and bank ownership
also found that co-operative banks were much less likely to fail than those owned by private
shareholders….Part of the reason may lie on ownership and governance structures (The
Economist, January 23d 2010: 66).
In Portugal, in respect to credit cooperatives, the law only considers the existence of
agricultural credit cooperatives, the CCAM (Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo). While,
origin of CCAM goes back to the XVI century, its legal birth occurred in 1911. Following the
democratization of the country in 1974 and the entrance to the European Union in 1986, the
CCAM witnessed a spectacular growth in their activity. This period, characterized by initial
euphoria and disorganization, ends with the creation, in 1992, of a financial group, the Credito
Agrícola Group. Presently, the Credito Agrícola is one of the main financial national groups.
In terms of Net Assets (7th), Deposits (6th), and Dimension of the Retail Franchise (3rd).
Table 1 bellow presents the four biggest Portuguese commercial banks and Crédito Agrícola
market share of Portuguese banking system.
Table 1 - The Biggest Portuguese Banks, by December 2008
(Figures in EUR million and activity for Portugal only)











Employment (n.º) 9.747 17.00% 10.687 18.64% 7.942 13.75% n.a. __ 3.858 6.73%
Branches (n.º) 832 13.29% 918 14.66% 743 11.87% n.a __ 673 10.75%
Net Assets 111,060 23.29% 94,424 19.80% 75,187 15.77% 39,963 8.38% 11,447 2.40%
Equity 5484 20.83% 8559 32.52% 4653 17.68% 1315 5.00% 979 3.72%
Net Profit 459 13.34% 201 5.84% 403 11.71% 360 10.46% 121 3.52%
Net Loans 77,432 24.09% 72,372 22.51% 45,901 14.28% 27,941 8.69% 7,188 2.24%
Total Deposits 60,128 27.60% 66,264 30.41% 26,387 12.11% 19,002 8.72% 9,158 4.20%
Note: n. a. – not available; Market share in percentage.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on company annual reports; Bank of Portugal and Portuguese Banking
Association websites.
2The table above shows that Crédito Agrícola has a significant position in the Portuguese
banking system, namely, regarding employment, branches network and total deposits. A
structural analysis shows that Crédito Agrícola has a high dependency of costumers’ deposits
and presents one of the sector best levels of capitalization.
Additionally, comparing the Group performance with other relevant national banks, the
Crédito Agrícola presents an excellent position regarding efficiency, solvency, liquidity, and
customers claims. Table 2 bellow shows some performance indicators of Crédito Agrícola
(SICAM) and its position regarding the banking sector performance.
Table 2 – Crédito Agrícola Position, by December 2009
Performance Indicators Values Ranking
Transformation Ratio* 87.0% 1st
Efficiency Ratio** 49.8% 2nd
Return on Assets (ROA)*** 1.0% 2nd
Return on Equity (ROE)**** 12.2% 4th
Solvency Tier 1 Ratio****** 12.0% 1st
Costumer claims:
Deposits: claims per 1000 accounts 0.06 1st
Housing credit: claims per 1000 contracts 0.89 2nd
Checks: claims per 10,000 checks processed 0.06 1st
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2010); Banco de Portugal (2010)
* Net Loans / Deposits; ** Structural Costs / Net Worth  [Structural costs include amortisation + general administrative
expenses + staff costs; Net Worth include financial margin + net commissions + other income (including results from
financial operations)] *** Net Profit/ Average Net Assets; ****Net Profit / Equity; ***** Basic Own Funds / Weighted
Risks (assets + off-balance-sheet items)
Crédito Agrícola presents the lowest transformation ratio. Historically, it never presented a
value higher than 90%, a percentage much inferior to all the generality of the other financial
institutions that exceed 100%. This fact has a positive influence in terms of CCAM liquidity.
Efficiency ratio reflects CCAM efficiency-cost efforts and its ability to explore economies of
scale. Indeed, in the last years CCAM were able to control the increase of structural costs
bellow net worth, although the year saw some institutions with efficiency ratios down, given
the harsher operating conditions. Return on operations overall was therefore good, with ROA
coming in at 1%, better than most of the other banks. ROE came in at around 12.2%, an
indication of the high level of financial autonomy in SICAM. Given the Crédito Agrícola
cooperative nature, profits are mostly directed to the reinforcement of equity. This continuous
reinforcement reflects in the solvency ratio of 12%, the best of Portuguese banking sector and
much higher than the 8% imposed by Bank of Portugal. Finally, the quality of the services
provided by Crédito Agrícola (valuated by the costumer claims indicator) is one of the best.
Except for banking operations, the CCAM are ruled by following the traditional cooperative
principles, namely, open membership, democratic control and restricted residual claims. The
3dual nature of credit cooperative is reflected by their formal and institutional solutions. In
recent years CCAM felt the need for some adjustments in their legislative framework and
after a long process of negotiations between Bank of Portugal and the CCAM representatives,
new changes were introduced in 2009, adopting a regime closest to the one ruling investor
owned firms (IOF).
The main aim of this paper is to provide an insight of the Portuguese legislative framework of
credit cooperative keeping in mind the specificities related with ownership property rights and
governance. To achieve the goal, besides this introduction the paper is organized as follows:
section 2 describes the evolution of the agricultural credit cooperative; section 3 includes the
legal framework of the Portuguese agricultural credit cooperative making some comparisons
with the non-cooperative banks; section 4 describes the model of governance used by the
credit cooperative system; finally, the paper concludes with some final remarks in section 5.
2. Evolution of the agricultural credit cooperatives
The Cooperative Banking System in Portugal comprises only agricultural credit cooperatives.
Although Portuguese Cooperative Code stipulates credit as one of the cooperative branches,
there is no legal regime for credit cooperatives in Portugal but a legal regime for agricultural
credit cooperatives. Consequent of Portuguese legislation only agricultural credit cooperatives
can be founded in the domestic territory. This is a serious gap in the Portuguese law, since it
limits the cooperative movement growth in the credit system, and is contrary to Constitutional
Law and European legislation. Indeed, according to the Directive 2000/12/CE, a cooperative
bank with headquarters in any other EU Member, and, therefore, authorized by their national
central bank to perform banking activities there, can operate in Portugal, without the
restrictions imposed by Portuguese law to domestic cooperative institutions (Fróis, 2009).
The genesis of Portuguese agricultural cooperative credit goes back to the XVI century, to an
institution called Common Barns, allowing farmers to keep stocks and seek financing. The
early CCAM were of small size, membership consisted of small farmers with low incomes.
Management activity was exercised by voluntary individuals with no business or finance
skills. This initial period was of absolute failure: the capital provided by the state was
insufficient to accomplish the objectives; and the cooperatives used to pursuit managers’
personal goals, being common to find management mistakes and even frauds when audited
(Cabo, 2003). Despite these setbacks the number of CCAM grew significantly until the 1929
financial crisis. Consequently, CCAM cooperatives were placed under the umbrella of Caixa
Geral de Depósitos, a state owned and simultaneously the biggest Portuguese bank institution.
4During the dictatorial regime “Estado Novo” (1931-1974) CCAM were used to restrict the
expansion of the communist ideology and to control the rural population. It was a lifeless
period for CCAM. Thus, until 1976, the CCAM played a minor role in Portuguese banking
system, with a share of only 1% of total deposits and credit.
Following the 1974 political changes, all private financial institutions were nationalized,
except for CCAM and non-Portuguese financial institutions. CCAM started a lobby
movement for autonomy, expanding implantation and broad its activity.
In 1978, occurs the creation of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Credit
Institutions (FENACAM), to support and represent the interests of their associates, both
national and internationally.
In 1982, the sixty years old Agricultural Cooperative Credit law suffers profound alterations
by the publication of a specific Legal Regime for Agricultural Cooperative Credit (RJCAM).
Subsequently, CCAM run off Caixa Geral de Depósitos guardianship and, in 1984, Caixa
Central was founded, whose mission was to regulate the credit activity of their associates.
In 1986, Portugal joins the European Union (EU), with the following ten years being a period
of deep transformations in Portuguese economy. The CCAM were considered an important
player in the framework of a financing strategy for the development of the agricultural sector.
So, during the eighties of last century the CCAM activity experienced a spectacular growth in
their activity.
In 1991, it was created the Integrated System of Agricultural Cooperative Credit (SICAM)
formed by Caixa Central and associated CCAM. Caixa Central was empowered with the
mission of supervision, intervention, guidance and representation of SICAM. SICAM
establishes a regime of co-responsibility between Caixa Central and the associates, therefore
solvency and liquidity supervision is accountable on consolidated basis. A more demanding
framework for the creation and functioning of the CCAM, along with the reinforcement of
CCAM own funds, put term to the joint liability of CCAM members. The “agency
agreement” allowed CCAM to intermediate operations that are forbidden to them in its
normal scope of activity, by acting as Caixa Central representative.
Four years later, in 1995, the RJCAM was modified, widening the scope of CCAM operations
to other activities connected to rural world as hunting, fishing, agro-tourism, handcraft, and
allowing CCAM to give out excesses to members (limited to 30% of net profits and once
complying with legal and prudential equity requirements) and convert reserves into capital
5shares transferable to members. This modifications were crucial to boost CCAM ability to
attract new (and deeper investing) members, improving CCAM capitalization. Additionally,
the new diploma expanded Caixa Central’s activities converting it into a truly universal bank.
In 2009, new changes were introduced in RJCAM adopting a governance model closest to the
ruling of private enterprises and brightening up CCAM activity and membership restrictions,
widening the members’ scope as well as the possibility of the CCAM to carry out credit
operations with no members or purposes not agriculturally related. Additionally, once CCAM
comply with the prudential requirements applied to banks, they are authorized to perform the
majority of the commercial activities carried out by the remaining financial institutions.
During the last two decades, along with organic growth of the CCAM a regional merging
process occurred, and consequently, the number of CAAM fall from the prior 220 in the
1990s to 91 in 2009. Simultaneously the CA has direct and indirect holdings in affiliated and
associated firms1, resulting in the Group represented in Figure 1.
1 Affiliated companies are those where the holding is more than 50% of equity. Associated companies are those where the holding is
between 20% and 50% or where SICAM has a significant influence, directly or indirectly, on management and financial policy.
6Figure 1 - Crédito Agrícola Group2 Structure
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2009)
Essentially, the agricultural credit cooperative system in Portugal is made up of an integrated
system (SICAM) of two types of cooperatives: the central and the singles (associated), i.e.,
SICAM = Central CCAM + Associated CCAM, including 91 CCAM. Altogether, they have
681 domestic branches in mainland Portugal and the Azores Islands, plus 2 offshore branches.
There is no doubt that the Crédito Agrícola robustness increases the CCAM capacity to act as
financial leverage in the socio-economic development of its regions, fulfilling Crédito
Agrícola corporate mission “… contributing to the development of Local Communities.”
(Crédito Agrícola, 2010). The CCAM assume fully its inclusion function, being spread across
all domestic territory, with exception of the Island of Madeira. SICAM network market share,
at national level, except for Lisbon and Oporto Conurbations, is considerable, in some
districts, more than 30% of the district banking network is owned by CCAM, and this
percentage is even higher in some towns. In fact, in 250 villages, the only financial institution
2 Credito Agrícola SGPS - Holding Company; CCCAM  SGPS - Holding Company; CA Seguros - Non-Life Insurance Company; Rural
Rent- Long Term Car Rental Company; CA Serviços - Shared Purchasing and Services Company Systems; CA Gest - Funds and Assets &
Liabilities Management; CA Vida - Life Insurance Company; CA Consult - Mergers & Acquisitions, Consulting; CA Informática - Data
Processing.
7is the CCAM local office and, in more than about 400 other small villages the only link to the
banking system is the ATM machine provided by the local CCAM. In terms of geographic
distribution (Figure 2) CCAM are very different from the other banks, given that over half of
its costumers (53.3%) live in the country’s inland regions. The Crédito Agrícola has a special
responsibility in these circumstances. Its distribution across regions means it is present in
many places where the economic strength has been sapped. Thus, a very high proportion of
the costumers (more than 90%) have low and moderate incomes (Credito Agricola, 2009)
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In organizational terms, the CCAM have freedom of association with the Central CCAM and
they can operate outside SICAM, although the rules for this are more stringent and
approximate more to those that prevail in other credit institutions. Currently, only five CCAM
remain outside SICAM. The Central CCAM (holding in 100% by the CCAM) role has no
parallel in the remaining financial institutions. Central CCAM is a financial institution under
the cooperative form, offering a full service bank, competing in equal terms with the largest
banks operating in Portugal3. Central CCAM acts as central bank for the group, creating and
developing a joint banking strategy4.
Although Bank of Portugal are the responsible for the banking sector supervision, regarding
SICAM associates the law delegates great part of these functions in the Central CCAM
which, in turn, is under the Bank of Portugal supervision. The Bank of Portugal defines the
relations and prudential limits applicable to the SICAM, and supervises the system accounts
on consolidated basis. Central CCAM assures the fulfilment of SICAM and associated
3 The Central CCAM aims the concession of credit and the practice of remain acts inherent to the banking activity, in the same terms as
commercial banks. However, it should not compete with the associates. For example, Central CCAM is authorized to open branches, in the
same terms of banks, but previously it must consult the local associated CCAM.
4 For instance, individual excess of liquidity is transferred to Central CCAM, which can lend to non primary economic sectors or transact in
the money, foreign exchange or capital markets.
8CCAM solvency and liquidity rules and controls and guides them. The accounts consolidation
of associated CCAM is of Central CCAM responsibility in compliance with the terms defined
by the Bank of Portugal. Specifically, Central CCAM orientation powers include the
definition of general rules: (a) necessary to assure the fulfilment of the solvency and liquidity
rules of the SICAM and associated CCAM; (b) of commercial and credit granting policies
including the setting up of guarantees; (c) regarding admission, remuneration, formation and
qualification of the staff; (d) regarding to the creation of new offices; (e) to define general
rules of office’ operation and security.
Additionally, without damaging Bank of Portugal competences, Central CCAM is empowered
to control their associated CCAM administrative, technical and financing aspects and their
organization5 and management. Moreover, Central CCAM can intervene in the associates, by
the assignment of a representative to track CCAM management or the nomination of
provisory directors. When it verifies a disequilibrium situation that can jeopardize the CCAM
daily running, the solvency is at risk or serious irregularities occur. Plus, when the associated
is in (risk of) financial disequilibrium and unfollow Central CCAM guidelines, Central
CCAM can dismiss total or part of the associated management and supervision boards and
assign provisory directors to them.
Finally, Central CCAM guarantees the associates without limitations and is also guaranteed
by them.  In fact, Central CCAM guarantees the obligations assumed by the associated
CCAM, even if they are previous to the fellowship, in the same conditions a bailer guarantees
the obligations of warranted, without enjoying the right of exclusion. SICAM is, by this way,
subordinated to a double guardianship, in fact Central CCAM is the direct responsible not
only for the organization, but also for the associates economic and financial management.
3. Legal framework
Even formed under the idea of economic freedom, is in most legal systems, the banking and
financial activity is subject to severe regulations and monitoring of supervision authorities,
due of its importance to the real economy and social confidence.
The credit intermediation is the core business of banking activity. It’s through deposits and
other forms of collecting of savings that financial institutions obtain the necessary funds to
apply in loans and other forms of credit. Under the financial institution definition provided by
5 Exemplifying, a Central CCAM unfavourable appreciation regarding the registration of the associates’ governance bodies implies the
refusal of their registration by the Bank of Portugal.
9the RG6 lays a mix of institutions. Homogeneous types of institutions like banks along
institutions with specific characteristics, as the CCAM. There are institutions that can perform
all operations allowed to the banks while others only can perform the operations endorsed by
the legislation ruling their specific activity. Indeed, there are two types of credit institutions:
the universal and the specialized ones. The first can perform unrestrictively all banking
operations, the second have unique characteristics and only can perform the operations
allowed by their specific legislation. CCAM are credit institutions specialized because of
various restrictions imposed by RJCAM, namely, territorial area and authorized operations.
According to the RJCAM7, the CCAM are credit institutions under the cooperative form,
whose goal is to perform agricultural credit operations in favour of their associates, as well as
the remaining banking acts inherent to the banking activity. Thus, CCAM are under a special
regime, essentially because of their cooperative form and the link to the priority goal of
performing agricultural credit operations in favour of their associates.
RJCAM specifies that CCAM are created under the cooperative form, limited liability and
seek, without lucrative proposes, the satisfaction of its members economic, social and cultural
needs and aspirations. The CCAM present, in this way, structural and intrinsic differences to
banks, since according to RG banks must adopt the public limited company (corporation)
form and, therefore, aiming profit.
The RJCAM has several limitations resulting from their social object, territorial area and
members´ attributes. Plus, it’s hard for CCAM to increase their issued share capital once they
cannot publicly do it. These limitations have counterpart in minor issued share capital,
organizational structure, technical and human resources available, solvency, control and
accountability requirements (in individual but not in consolidate basis).
The 2009 RJCAM alterations basically aimed to adjust CCAM governance model to ones set
for corporations in the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code (CCC), and, simultaneously,
widen the CCAM members’ base, approaching it to the other financial institutions, boosting
issued share capital increase, in view of the recession felted in the agricultural sector.
The Table 3 summarizes the main features of cooperative credit and the main differences to
(non cooperatives) banks, according to Portuguese legislation. The Central CCAM as
mentioned above has unique features and, thus, is subjected to a separate analysis.
6 RG - General Regime of Credit and Financial Institutions, approved by the Decree Law nº 298/92.
7 Approved by Decree of Law n.º 24/91, with the following alterations, and republished in apex of the Decree of Law  n.º 142/2009.
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Table 3 – CCAM versus Non Cooperative Banks
CCAM Non Cooperative Banks Central CCAM
Creation Bank of Portugal approval, following the agreement ofCentral CCAM and FENACAM Bank of Portugal approval Similar to banks.
Legal form
and nature
Credit Institution, Cooperative form
RJCAM (and subsidiarly: RG for the banking activity, and
Cooperative Code and other cooperative legislation) applies.
Credit Institution, Public limited company (corporation)
form
RG applies.
Credit Institution, Cooperative form
RJCAM
Operations
Granting credit primarily to their members and for financing
of primary sector activities. CCAM complying, in individual
basis, with prudential rules settled in the RG, can perform
operations with no members or financing activities outside
primary sector until 35% of the net assets. Exceptionally,
that limit can be raised to 50% by the Bank of Portugal for
SICAM associates, by Caixa Central suggestion.
Additionally, CCAM that have adequate structural
conditions and sufficient funds could be authorized by the
Bank of Portugal to perform mostly of the remaining
activities allowed to banks, with few exceptions.
No specific restrictions applied. Operations stipulated in
general to credit and financial institutions legislation and
inherent to its credit intermediation function.
Sufficiently ample scope: Reception of deposits or other
reimbursed funds; credit operations; payment services and
transactions on their costumers behalf or on its own;
participation in issuing and placement of securities;
operate in the interbank markets; management and
consulting of assets; holding participation in the
companies capital; other operations.
Similar to banks.
Representation of SICAM and supervision, orientation
and monitoring competences over the associated
CCAM.
Membership
Singular or collective person, that carry out any activity
linked to primary sector (production, transformation or
services) in the CCAM territory (or adjacent). Membership
outside primary sector activities is permitted but limited to
35% of the CCAM members. Exceptionally, that limit can be
raised up to 50% by the Bank of Portugal.
Minimum shareholding: € 500
Minimum of 50 members.
There are no restrictions regarding the membership
profile.
Shareholdings up to 20%, 33%, or 50% of the capital




Other entities linked to the agricultural cooperative
credit, with Bank of Portugal approval.
Territorial
scope
CCAM activity is restricted to their headquarter
municipality. CCAM can expand to an adjacent region if
there is no other CCAM operating there, or when that results
from CCAM merger.
National scope National scope
Opening of
branches
The branch opening is subject the authorization of the
Central CCAM for associated CCAM and of the Bank of
Portugal, for independent CCAM.





Capital is variable; it can be increased by new members’
admission or higher shareholdings, or by the incorporation of
reserves; or it can be reduced by members exit or lower
shareholdings or by covering losses.
Capital reduction is restrained by prudential rules. The
maximum reimbursement value is defined by the accounting
value net of compulsory reserves.
Capital minimum fixed by the Ministry of Finance: 7.5
million Euros;  SICAM associates: 1.496 million Euros (5
million Euros until 30th June of 20158)
The general rules for public limited company applies,
except regarding capital reduction that requires previous
authorization of Bank of Portugal.
Capital minimum fixed by Bank of Portugal:  10 million
Euros.
Capital can be increased by new members’ admission or
higher shareholdings, or by the incorporation of
reserves.
Shareholding reimbursement is restrained by prudential
rules and requires the General Meeting approval.
Capital minimum fixed by the Ministry of Finance:
17.5 million Euros
Minimum shareholding: € 5000
Maximum shareholding: 10% of capital, except in the
case of extraordinary supplies.
Resources
Deposits and other reimbursed funds from their members
and/or costumers. The access to other financing means,
namely, interbank market, requires the Bank of Portugal (and
Central CCAM for associated CCAM) approval.
General financing means stipulated in Cooperative Code,
namely, issuing of investment securities or debt.
Similar to CCAM: deposits or other reimbursed funds
from the public. The access to other financing means,





Besides deposits, CCAM can make applications in public
debt in conditions established by Bank of Portugal.
CCAM can only hold participations: (a) in regional unions,
Central CCAM and FENACAM; (b) in enterprises whose
object is of regional interest (until 20% of own funds); (c) to
assure the reimbursement of credits; (d) when especially
authorized by Bank of Portugal9.
No restrictions. Similar to banks.
Governance
Bodies
The management and supervision bodies (composition and
competences) stipulated for corporations apply, preserving
the importance and competences of the General Meeting
characteristic of the cooperative model.
The general governance models stipulated for public
limited company apply.
Similar to CCAM.
Existence of an advisory body, elected between the






Company bylaws can impose “poison pills” or other anti
hostile takeover measures.
No.
8 By 30th June 2015, CCAM capital should reach at least € 5 million; beginning with € 2.5 million by 30th June 2011 followed by an annual increase of € 0.5 million.
9 CCAM hold direct participations in the Crédito Agrícola specialized companies under this special authorization.
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Voting rules Principle of democracy, voting right independent of
shareholding value: one member, one vote.
Principle of proportionality to the shareholding value.
Company bylaws establish the conditions for voting rights
acquisition and can limit voting rights exercise10.
Principle of democracy, excepting for some specific
decisions (election of the Central CCAM board of
directors, budget approval and profits allocation) in
which the voting rights can differ according to the
shareholding and CCAM average deposits and the
solvency ratio.
Reserves
CCAM must allocate up to 50% of the net profits to the
reserves: (a) at least 20% to the legal reserve until it reaches
the value of issued share capital; (b) at least 20% to the
special reserve for reinforcement of equity in the case of
CCAM under financial restructuration process, until it
reaches the value of amount to the benefits obtained with the
process; (c) between  1% - 5% to the members’ education;
and (d) a max of 5% to the mutualism reserve.
CCAM statutes can design other reserves.
Banks must allocate at least 10% of net profits to the legal
reserve until it reaches the value of issued share capital.
Bank of Portugal can stipulate the creation of an additional
reserve to reinforce banks capital adequacy.




After covering eventual losses of previous exercises, profits
not allocated to the reserves can be distributed among
members. The remuneration of capital shares is limited to
30% of the results11.
Profits cannot be distributed if the CCAM do not comply
with prudential rules, or if the member shareholding is
inferior of the minimum required, in which case his portion
of the profit will revert to it.
Profits not allocated to reserves can be distributed among
members without restrictions.
Profits not allocated to reserves can be distributed
among members.
Associated CCAM can deliberate by majority of the
entire membership voting rights profits allocation to
reserves.
Supervision Bank of Portugal. Central CCAM for SICAM associates. Bank of Portugal, CMVM for listed banks. Bank of Portugal
Tax Policy
Profits are subjected to a rate (IRC) of 20%; excepting the
results of no members operations or activities outside
cooperative purposes and the taxation on consolidated basis,
in which the IRC general rules apply12.
The IRC general rules apply. The IRC general rules apply.
Deposits
insurance
Insurance Fund of Agricultural Cooperative Credit. This
fund besides secure the CCAM costumer deposits, performs
an active role in the SICAM economic and financial
restructuring process, as part of its task to promote SICAM
solvency and liquidity.
Deposits Insurance Fund, limited to the simple guarantee
of bank costumer deposits. The participation in
restructuring operations is forbidden
Insurance Fund of Agricultural Cooperative Credit
10 Two of the biggest Portuguese commercial banks limit the voting rights for purposes of their exercise to 20%, by a statutory provision. See Table A in annex
11 CCAM do no usually give out profit to members. Members’ remuneration usually takes the form of capital shares allocation resulting from the incorporation of reserves.
12 According to the Cooperative Tax Statute, Law n.º 85/98.  Although, according to FENACAM (2009) cooperative credit system is, inside of the Portuguese Financial System, in percentile terms, the greater
contributor. In many cases cooperative credit system taxation is triple of the other banking company.
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4. The governance of the cooperative credit system
The management and supervising of CCAM is structured according to the model formats
(composition and competences) stipulated by law for corporations (Commercial Code to
Corporations). It’s a deviation from the general cooperative organization structure of the
Cooperative Code, in favour of the corporation model, but keeping the original cooperative
matrix.
According to CCC, the company governance bodies include: shareholders general meeting
and management and supervision bodies13. The management and supervision of the
companies may take on a 3 model format: i) Board of Directors, Audit Board and Statutory
Auditor; ii) Board of Directors, Audit Committee and a Statutory Auditor; iii) Executive
Board of Directors, General and Supervisory Board and a Statutory Auditor. Table 4 in next
page shows the standard organization charts.
In the first 2 model formats, the Board of Directors is responsible for managing the activities
of the company, and should be subordinated to the resolutions of shareholders or to the
intervention of the Supervisory Board or the Audit Committee only in those cases where the
Law or the Company bylaws stipulate it. In the third model format, the Executive Board of
Directors is responsible for managing the activities of the company, without prejudice to the
company bylaws of the company establishing that the Executive Board of Directors is
required to obtain prior consent from the General and Supervisory Board before practicing
certain categories of acts. The Board of Directors may delegate management powers to an
Executive Committee or to one or more Chief-Executive Officers. The Auditing activities are
carried out by the Audit Board and the Statutory Auditor for the first model format, the Audit
Committee and the Statutory Auditor for the second model format and the General and
Supervisory Board and Statutory Auditor for the third model format. In any of the previous
cases, the Statutory Auditor shall proceed with the examination and statutory audits. The
General and Supervisory Board shall appoint a Financial Matters Committee that is solely
responsible for carrying out a set of supervisory duties provided for by Law (CMVM, 2007).
The General Meeting is the supreme governing body of cooperatives, is composed by all the
cooperative members enjoying full rights. Decision making process is democratic (one
member, one vote) and its decisions are mandatory for the other social bodies and to all
cooperative members.
13 Other governance bodies: i) Company Secretary- by Law, quoted companies must appoint a Company Secretary. The Company Secretary,
in addition to the administrative functions of keeping the records of meeting minutes of board and general meetings and keeping and
certifying documents related to them, is also responsible for answering questions made by shareholders under their right to information and
to certify company actions; ii) Remunerations Committee-  the Remuneration Committee's function is to fix the remuneration of the
governance bodies members, and to formulate the remuneration policy and the retirement regime to apply.
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Table 4 – Corporations Standard Governance Model Formats
Corporations Governance Bodies Standard social organization charts
Model 1 - General Meeting, Board of Directors , Audit Board and
Statutory Auditor*
*The existence of a Statutory Auditor, independent of the Audit Board
is mandatory
Model 2 - General Meeting, Board of Directors, Audit Committee** and
Statutory Auditor
**
 Audit Committee members are non executive Directors
Model 3 - General Meeting,  Executive Board of Directors, General and
Supervisory Board, Financial Matters Committee*** and Statutory Auditor
***The existence of a committee for financial matters in the general and















Board of Directors Audit Board
Statutory Auditor (ROC)
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Matters of the General Meeting exclusive competence, according to the Cooperative Code: i)
electing and dismissing cooperative bodies members; ii) deliberating on the annual report and
accounts, as well as the audit board report; and on the next year’s budget and plan of
activities; iii) appreciating certificate audit reports;  iv) setting the interest rates payed to
members and remuneration of the cooperative social bodies members, when the bylaws allow
it; v) approving profit distribution; vi) amending bylaws and internal regulations; vi)
approving cooperative merge, split or dissolution and its affiliation in unions, federations and
confederations; vii) deliberating on members exclusion and social bodies’ loss of mandate,
and acting as appeal court, for the admission or refuse of new members, or for the sanctions
applied by the management body; viii) deciding of the right of civil or criminal action against
cooperative management and supervision members; ix) appreciating the matters included in
the Cooperative Code, complementary specific arm legislation or in the bylaws.
The majority of SICAM associated CCAM have adopted the model 1 format and central
CCAM opted for the model 3 format, with an Advisory Board as mandatory by RJCAM
“…comprising of a maximum of 15 members, of which 9 correspond to CCAM elected among
the associates not represented in the other social bodies, and the 6 remain to non elected
members, being the corresponding places filled up for inherence of functions or by
personalities of recognized merit, external to the SICAM”.
These 6 (not CCAM) advisory members are an innovation of 2009 RJCAM and an effort to
bring some independence and outside SICAM expertise to Crédito Agrícola management.
Additionally, contrary to former RJCAM (that specified the advisory board competences),
this RJCAM amend left open the advisory board competences to be defined by Central
CCAM bylaws.
Although Crédito Agrícola performance compares favourably with that of other credit
institutions, individual CCAM occasionally do enter in distress as illustrated by history. The
increasingly large size of the CCAM raises concerns regarding the resolution of potential
distress situations given some of the cooperative governance rules.
In particular, the restrictions on control rights and residual claims linked to the cooperative
governance framework limits the range of options for resolving systemically important
CCAM as it makes raising capital more difficult for these organizations. Vaguely defined
ownership rights combined with restricted voting rights might prevent raising capital from
existing and new members, particularly at time of distress when large investors are more
likely to provide capital injections. In the past, resolution of CCAM typically involved the
merge or incorporation of the weak CCAM by another CCAM (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005a).
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However, this resolution mechanism is more difficult to apply to a large systemic CCAM.
Also, CCAM regional orientation can be a strong constraint to find another CCAM able to
absorb it, without losing their territorial identity.
Plus, the cooperative governance structure limits shareholders control over management.
Democratic decision making and weak ownership property rights result in minimal
contributions. The resulting diffusion of ownership property rights exacerbates, according to
agency cost theory, owner-manager conflicts, given that members typically do not have the
incentive to exert effective control over management. Moreover, some effective mechanisms
of management control such as the threat of takeover are virtually nonexistent due to the
voting rule. Within SICAM management control are often exercised by Central CCAM that
operates the orientation and supervision function and therefore, is the first to learn about
managerial failures. In cases of gross management failure or fraud, the management can be
formally dismissed by the Central CCAM, under its supervision and intervention powers.
Cabo and Rebelo (2005b) show the importance of this mechanism in disciplining bad
management in the presence of decision-related incentive problems of cooperatives, which
create a potentially weak internal system of corporate governance. However, this solution is
not free of costs and not only financial costs. The social costs of these interventions are far
more dangerous. Civil actions and protesting movements against Central CCAM interventions
questioning their legitimacy are usual. The most recent polemic involves the dismissal of the
management and supervision bodies of a CCAM even before they are in office. On the other
hand, endless interventions are not unusual, as illustrated by the more than ten years
intervention14 on two of the major associated CCAM. In this case is difficult to defend the
cooperative status of a CCAM, once it is no longer a user-owned and user-controlled
business.
Most of the governance reform proposals within the cooperative credit involve some level of
cooperative principles sacrifice.  But surprisingly, the solution for the CCAM governance
problems might lay in the Cooperative Code. Indeed, implementing proxy voting or
promoting the issuance of nonvoting shares and hybrid capital instruments granting investors
the right to appoint a delegate to assist at the supervision body meetings, as referred in
Cooperative Code, can enhance shareholders participation and provide additional capital in
distress times.
14 Interventions have up to one year of lifetime, after that it can be renewed.
17
5. Final remarks
The Portuguese credit cooperative system is a typical example of how public entities can
influence the development of the credit cooperative institutions. Until 1990´s of last century
CCAM have no control over its own life. Been developed in a top-down process, the CCAM
depend on public funds to carry out its mission and were often used to accomplish political
goals. Indeed, CCAM were used to put on the field the public vision to the rural economy and
rural population.
Like cooperatives in other sectors, the CCAM increasingly face survival challenges related to
financial issues linked with equity capital. Being not-for-profit enterprises CCAM do not have
access to publicly raised capital. Thus, CCAM capital base growth is supported by their
retained profits. During 1990s the solution adopted by them to overcome this constraint was
based in the creation of an economic group and an intense process of mergers.  This strategy
allowed the CCAM to benefit of scale and scope economies and improve their financial
structure. Additionally, legislative changes delegating to Central CCAM part of Bank of
Portugal supervision competences proved to be beneficial to control the CCAM management.
Presently, CCAM system enjoys of a healthy financial situation, however its pursuit of
economic and financial success are driving the CCAM away from the cooperative identity
and diluting their cooperative advantages. CCAM face the challenge of matching the
application of the traditional cooperative rules (along with the resulting set of vaguely defined
property rights) with being successful in an ever more strong and competitive banking sector.
Worldwide cooperatives have adopted varied strategies to beat difficulties inherent to the
cooperative form. Most of the solutions presented are based in some degree of deviation from
the traditional cooperative principles. CCAM implemented a very different strategy. They
opted to focus their efforts on the cooperative activity and performance rather than on the
cooperative rules it selves. Still, facing an increasingly competitive banking sector, the 2009
RJCAM changes ameliorate CCAM activity (product and territory) restrictions and near their
governance model to the corporations’ model. It’s an alteration that distances RJCAM from
the Cooperative Code. Nevertheless, is in the Cooperative Code that CCAM can find the
solutions for some of their governance problems without losing their identity.
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Table A - The Biggest Portuguese Banks Governance Models*
Governance Bodies Voting rights
CGD
Model 1
 Board of General Meeting: 3 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary)
 Board of Directors: 7 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 5 Directors);
 Audit Board: 3 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 1 Director)
 External Auditor
 Company Secretary
The Portuguese State is the
only shareholder, being
represented in the general
meeting by a person assigned
by the Minister of Finance.
BCP
Model 3
 Board of General Meeting: 3 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary)
 Executive Board of Directors: 9 members (Chairman, 3 Vice-Chairman,
5 Directors);
 General and Supervisory Board: 13 members (Chairman, 2 Vice-
Chairman, 10 Directors);
 Statutory Auditor
  Remunerations and Welfare Board: 3 members (Chairman, 2Directors);
 Company Secretary
1000 shares -  one vote
Shareholders not entitled to
vote may form a group with
other shareholders to make up
the number of shares required
to grant the right to vote.
According to a statutory
provision, the voting rights for




 Board of General Meeting: 3 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary)
 Board of Directors: 26 members (Chairman, 2 Vice-Chairman, 23
Directors):
 Executive Committee: 11 members
 Audit Committee: 3 members
 Statutory Auditor
 Company Secretary
100 shares – one vote
Shareholders not entitled to
vote may form a group with
other shareholders to make up
the number of shares required
to grant the right to vote.
BPI
Model 1
 Board of General Meeting: 4 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 2
Secretary)
 Board of Directors: 25 members (Chairman, 3 Vice-Chairman,  21
Directors);
 Executive Committee: 7 members;
 Audit Board: 3 members (Chairman, 2 Directors);
 Statutory Auditor
 Remuneration Committee: 3 members
 Company Secretary
500 shares – one vote
Shareholders not entitled to
vote may form a group with
other shareholders to make up
the number of shares required
to grant the right to vote.
According to a statutory
provision, the voting rights for




 Board of General Meeting: 3 members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary)
 General and Supervisory Board: 9 members (Chairman, 8 Directors);
 Executive Board of Directors: 5 members (Chairman, 4  Directors);
 Advisory Board: 9 members
 Statutory Auditor
One member – one vote
Excepting for some specific
decisions (election of the
Central CCAM board of
directors, budget approval and
profits allocation) in which the
voting rights can differ
according to the shareholding
and CCAM average deposits
and the solvency ratio.
* The governance bodies’ composition and competences are the referred in the CCC and complementary
legislation. The information was collected from the company bylaws and other documents (structure of
governance and organization charts) published by the banks.
